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PUTTING THE LAW BACK IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Suzanna Sherry* 
Taking a cue from Professor Laurence Tribe's decision to 
abandon the third edition of his constitutional law treatise. 1 the 
organizers of this symposium have asked us to address whether 
constitutional law is in crisis. I am agnostic on that question. al-
though I think that there has been a turn in the wrong direction. 
But if there is a crisis, I know who to blame. 
If constitutional law is in crisis, it is our fault. The legal 
academy has erased the distinction between law and politics. 
used its expertise for political advantage rather than for elucida-
tion, and mis-educated a generation of lawyers. We thus should 
not be surprised if judges have, as Professor Ristroph suggests. 
lost their faith in the Constitution. We have led them into the 
wilderness. 
Law, especially constitutional law. and especially the hard 
cases that reach the Supreme Court, is neither fully determinate 
nor fully indeterminate. Legal decision making (including consti-
tutional decision making) is, as I have argued elsewhere, con-
strained by precedent. by reason, by institutional structure and 
context, and by professional norms.c Those constraints are not 
perfect, nor do they eliminate discretion and disagreement. But 
to the extent that they remain influential. the constraints curb 
judicial excesses and ensure that constitutional doctrine remains. 
by and large, governed by the rule of law rather than by the 
whims of judges. 
The first problem is that many legal academics have stopped 
believing in the efficacy of those restraints, and consequently see 
little distinction between politics and law. Following the lead of 
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"attitudinalist"" political scientists. hordes of law professors now 
proclaim that constitutional law is nothing but politics, and 
judges are merely legislators in black robes.' (Ironically, political 
science scholarship is now moving away from attitudinalism4 -as 
usual, law professors are ten or twenty years behind the discip-
line from which they are borrowing ideas.) 
For some of these legal academics. the appropriate response 
is to attempt to reduce judicial discretion by imposing some 
overarching methodology of constitutional interpretation. But 
constitutional adjudication cannot be made mechanical, and all 
of these "grand theories" end up leaving judges with essentially 
as much discretion as they would have in the absence of the 
theory.' In addition, even the few judges who purport to adhere 
to one of these grand theories regularly depart from it. This at-
tempt to eliminate discretion, then, is a dead end-although we 
still can't seem to stop obsessing about it. 
Other academics take the opposite approach. Instead of 
taking politics out of constitutional law, they want to take consti-
tutional law away from the courts. The latest fad in constitution-
al theory seems to be popular constitutionalism." Popular consti-
tutionalists argue that because constitutional adjudication is 
3. The classic attitudinalist work in political science is JEFFREY A. SEGAL & 
HAROLD J. SPAETH. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993): see 
also Jeffrey A. Segal eta!.. Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Jus-
tices Rn·isited. 57 J. PoL. 812 (1995). For examples of endorsement by law professors. see 
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN. FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) (using the history of race-discrimination 
cases to argue that judges inevitably reflect popular opinion): JEFFREY ROSEN. THE 
MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA (2006) (arguing that 
courts reflect the views of popular majorities): Neal Devins. Better Luckv Than Good. 8 
GREEN BAG 2D 33 (2004) (arguing that the most important factor in judicial decisions is 
political events outside the control of the litigants): Barry Friedman. The Importance of 
Being Positive: The Nawre and Function of Judicial Re~·iew. 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257. 
1284 (2004) (stating that the idea of separating law from politics "may not even be cohe-
rent"). The idea that politics overshadows law in legal decision making is not new. but for 
tht: past 70 years or so has been embraced by only by a handful of critical legal scholars. 
Today it seems to permeate conventional constitutional thinking to an extent not seen 
since the demise of the most extreme versions of Legal Realism. 
4. See, e.g.. SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST 
APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds .. 1999): THE SUPREME 
COL'RT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (Howard 
Gillman & Cornell Clavton eds .. 1999). 
5. For an elaboration of this critique. see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA 
SHERRY. DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR 
CONSTITL'TIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002). 
6. See, e.g.. LARRY D. KRAMER. THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004): MARK TUSHNET. TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS ( 1999). 
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equivalent to legislative policy making, constitutional interpreta-
tion should be done only by the people or their representatives. 
It is hard to know how popular constitutionalism would work, 
since few (if any) of its advocates make any concrete suggestions 
about how to implement popular constitutional interpretation. 
But in any case, my view is that leaving constitutional decisions 
to the majority carries an unacceptably high risk of majority ty-
ranny. There is also the problem that many popular constitutio-
nalists are fair-weather friends of populism: When the Supreme 
Court is making decisions they agree with, they are perfectly 
happy to leave constitutional interpretation to the courts. 
The point, though, is not that both grand theory and popu-
lar constitutionalism are seriously flawed. The point is that their 
adherents share a cynical view of constitutional law: that it is not 
law, but politics. And the problem is that if even legal academics 
take that view, the conflation of law and politics is bound to in-
fect politicians, judges, and the American public. If everyone 
stops believing in the rule of law, we will have a crisis. Perhaps 
some of the doctrinal inconsistencies noted in this symposium 
are the leading edge of the crisis, but if so, it is because judges 
have begun to believe what academics have been telling them 
about the judicial role. 
The flip side of the focus on grand theory and popular con-
stitutionalism, of course, is a decline in doctrinal scholarship. 
Once the mainstay of legal scholarship, it is currently in disre-
pute. But if legal academics are not carefully examining constitu-
tional doctrine-including how it plays out in the lower courts-
then it is no wonder that we think the doctrine is in shambles. To 
the extent that constitutional adjudication is akin to common law 
adjudication,7 we cannot expect constitutional doctrine to be 
immediately and transparently coherent. It should be our task as 
academics to create coherence out of the mass of cases, and to 
uncover and rectify judicial lapses.H Again, however, if legal 
scholars believe that constitutional adjudication is more about 
politics than about law, they will be unable even to envision so-
phisticated doctrinal scholarship. 
Legal academics compound the problem- the second of my 
three accusations- by practicing what they preach. Law profes-
7. For support for this proposition. see. for example. David A. Strauss. Common 
Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle. 112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003): David A. 
Strauss. Common Law Constitllliona/ Interpretation. 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). 
8. See RICHARD A. POSNER. HOW JUDGES THINK 210-11 (2008). 
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sors as a group have multiple opportunities to enhance the rule 
of law. The media and the public often rely on law professors to 
clarify and explain constitutional decisions, and legal academics 
also draft amicus briefs. But lately we have been squandering 
those opportunities by using them to advocate particular politi-
cal viewpoints rather than to educate or elucidate. 
Law professors publicly criticize judicial opinions as "activ-
ist" or "political" rather than critiquing them on the merits. A 
widely-distributed e-mail solicited law professors to sign-
purportedly as experts-a letter interpreting an obscure clause 
of the Constitution, several even more obscure federal statutes, 
and "the laws of Florida," based solely on expertise acquired 
through "teaching and writing about the Constitution" general-
ly.9 Legal academics become "experts" quoted by the media 
through sound-bites and political punditry rather than through 
actual knowledge or thoughtful analysis. If constitutional law is 
just politics in disguise, then all this makes sense. But again, the 
more that legal academics manipulate law for political purposes, 
the more they encourage judges to do so. 
The third problem is that to the extent that we persuade our 
students that constitutional doctrine is political and therefore 
unprincipled, they will act on that belief as future lawyers, 
judges. elected officials, and citizens. This problem goes much 
deeper than simply teaching the legal realist or critical legal stu-
dies notion (now gradually taking over mainstream constitution-
al law) that the rule of law is really just the political preferences 
of the judges. The problem is built into the law school curricu-
lum itself. By attempting to teach constitutional law in the first 
year, as so many law schools now do, we almost guarantee that 
students will be drawn to the cynical view. 
Why? Because the vast majority of law students arrive at 
law school as either legal formalists or legal realists. Some of 
them think law is completely determinate, and some think it is 
completely indeterminate. They see the law as a matter of all 
correct answers or none. And if they are dissuaded from their in-
itial approach, their first reaction is usually to jump to the oppo-
site pole. If law is not completely determinate, it must be com-
pletely indeterminate (and vice versa). New students in any 
9. See Ward Farnsworth. Talking Out of School: Notes on the Transmission of In-
tellectual Capital from the Legal Academy to Public Tribunals. 81 B.U. L. REV. 13. 47-48 
(2001). 
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discipline are intellectually immature, and for that reason are 
likely to see black and white instead of shades of gray. 
It takes a while-usually more than just one semester-for 
law students to become comfortable with the middle ground be-
tween determinacy and indeterminacy, and to create for them-
selves a framework that accommodates both judicial discretion 
and the rule of law. It is easier for them to do this in courses that 
are neither as politically salient nor as politically controversial as 
constitutional law. If they see, for example. that the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure are neither linguistically determinate 
nor infinitely malleable, they can begin to grasp the inherent 
function of judges as principled interpreters of law. 
Constitutional doctrine is the most intellectually difficult 
subject to fit into this middle ground. (As I suggested earlier, 
even many legal academics maintain that it does not fit.) If we 
throw constitutional law at students before they have con-
structed a nuanced framework, they will instead have to choose 
between formalism and realism. Since it is virtually impossible 
for even neophytes to read Supreme Court opinions and con-
clude that constitutional law is determinate, they conclude that it 
is completely indeterminate-in other words. that only the 
judge's politics matter. We create another generation of lawyers 
who will question the existence of the rule of law and lament the 
crisis in constitutional doctrine. 
So I close with three suggestions: (1) Remove constitutional 
law from the first-year curriculum: (2) Take seriously the task of 
educating the public, the media. and the courts, and (3) Stop 
writing about constitutional theory and the perils of judicial re-
view and start focusing on constitutional/ow. 
